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Abstract
We reconsider the motivation of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the non-parametric
technique that is widely employed for analyzing productive efficiency in academia, the private
sector and the public sector. We first argue that the conventional engineering motivation
of DEA can be problematic since it often builds on unverifiable production axioms. We
then provide a dual viewpoint and highlight the ‘behavioral’ interpretation of DEA models.
We start from a specification of the production objectives while imposing minimal structure
on the production possibilities, and construct tools to meaningfully quantify deviations of
observed producer behavior from optimizing behavior. This brings to light the economic
meaning of DEA, provides guidelines for selecting the appropriate model in practical research
settings, and prepares the ground for instituting new DEA models. We also provide an
empirical application that demonstrates the practical relevance of our arguments. We hope
that our insights will contribute to the further dissemination of DEA, and stimulate public
sector applications of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.
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1 Introduction
The public sector is increasingly interested in the productive efficiency of its entities. For in-
stance, Coelli et al. (2003) extensively discuss the relevance of efficiency evaluations for regulated
sectors. More generally, the growing number of empirical applications suggests that productive
efficiency analysis is of key interest for many sectors such as academia, the business community
and government institutions; see, e.g., Gattoufi et al. (2004) and Emrouzenjad et al. (2008)
for overviews. This observation calls for well-established empirical tools that are specially tai-
lored for testing consistency of observed behavior with (theoretical) optimizing behavior, and for
quantifying deviations from optimization (or ‘inefficiencies’).
Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984),
among others, have advocated a ‘behavioral’ non-parametric approach to analyzing producer
behavior. This approach starts from a behavioral model of optimizing/efficient behavior and
allows for testing implications of micro-economic theory directly on the data. That is, one does
not need a functional representation of the production technology, and so one can minimize the
risk of erroneously rejecting optimizing producer behavior due to an erroneous parametric spec-
ification of the (typically unknown) technology. This is particularly convenient, since economic
theory does in general not imply a particular functional form and reliable specification tests are
not available in many cases.
Non-parametric efficiency analysis is increasingly applied for measuring the degree of ‘ef-
ficiency’ of observed producer behavior, most commonly under the label ‘Data Envelopment
Analysis’ (DEA; after Charnes et al. (1978)).1 DEA models are conventionally motivated from
‘engineering’ information, e.g. pertaining to the prevalent returns-to-scale or the marginal rates
of input substitution/output transformation. Still, such engineering information is mostly diffi-
cult to verify in practice. In fact, imposing production properties that cannot be justified in a
convincing way seems to conflict directly with the very nature of non-parametric analysis, which
1See Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007), Fried et al. (2008), and Cook and
Seiford (2009) for extensive surveys of DEA models.
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is often credited for imposing minimal structure on the research setting under investigation. This
consideration is particularly relevant for DEA evaluations of the public sector, which are usually
characterized by minimal information on the nature of production possibilities.
In this paper, we adopt an ‘economic’ (as opposed to ‘engineering’) perspective on DEA:
we start from a clear specification of the production-behavioral models and use minimal (non-
verifiable) engineering information. Our insights re-interpret DEA efficiency measures as mea-
sures for violations of economically optimizing behavior. To keep our exposition simple, we
mainly focus on profit maximizing and cost minimizing behavior. However, as we will indicate,
our insights readily extend towards alternative production-behavioral models. By making ex-
plicit this economic motivation of DEA, we hope to contribute to its further dissemination and
to stimulate public sector applications of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.
We note at the outset that our discussion bears some analogy to that in Banker and Maindi-
ratta (1988), Varian (1990) and Fa¨re and Grosskopf (1995), where a similar interpretation of
DEA efficiency measures is (implicitly) advocated.2 Unfortunately, although these ideas have
some clear advantages, they are only minimally used in the applied DEA literature; see, e.g.,
Cherchye et al. (2008, 2011 and 2012) for some applications that demonstrate the advantages
of the behavioral perspective of DEA. If only for that reason, it seems useful to set out method-
ological guidelines for economically meaningful applications of DEA. Furthermore, our discussion
includes a number of insights that have not yet been articulated in the literature, and prepares
the ground for instituting new DEA models depending on the production-behavioral model that
is subject to testing.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the conventional
‘axiomatic’ DEA approach for reconstructing production possibilities. Section 3 is concerned with
non-parametric economic efficiency analysis, following the perspective of Afriat (1972), Hanoch
and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984). Section 4 bridges the gap
between the seemingly distinct viewpoints adopted in Sections 2 and 3, and brings to light the
economic meaning of DEA. Section 5 presents an empirical application on efficiency in academia
and illustrates the relevance of choosing an appropriate DEA model. Section 6, finally, reproduces
2Actually, some of the ideas that we develop here were already implicit in the seminal DEA paper of Banker,
Charnes and Cooper (1984).
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the main insights and provides some concluding discussion.
2 Reconstructing production possibilities: an axiomatic
approach
A producer creates outputs from various combinations of inputs (factors of production). To
study producer choices we need a convenient way to summarize the production possibilities,
i.e. which inputs and outputs are technologically feasible. The set of all technologically feasible
input-output combinations is called the production possibility set.
To formally represent that set, we denote by z = (z1, . . . , zq) ∈ Rq a (non-zero) netput
vector with zj the value of netput commodity j. Positive components of z represent outputs and
negative components represent inputs. Throughout we assume that the vector z captures at least
one input and at least one output, and that all producers use the same commodities as inputs
and produce the same outputs. The production technology is represented by the (non-empty
and closed) production possibility set
T = {z ∈ Rq| netput z is technically feasible} . (1)
If we make the explicit distinction between input and output vectors, we use z = (−x, y)
with x ∈ Rl+ the input vector and y ∈ Rm+ the output vector (q = l + m). Then, the set T can
be decomposed into input requirement sets
LT (y) =
{
x ∈ Rl+ |(−x, y) ∈ T
}
, (2)
which contain all input vectors x that can produce the output vector y.
Production axioms. The true production possibility set T (or the input requirement set
LT (·)) is usually not observed. Therefore the DEA-type axiomatic approach typically approx-
imates the unobserved set T by an empirical production set that is constructed from a set of
observed producers. We represent each observed producer s by the netput vector zs = (−xs, ys),
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with s ∈ S = {1, . . . , |S|}, for S the set of observed producers. To construct the empirical
approximation of T , we will consider the production axioms A1-A4.3
A1 (inclusion of observations): ∀s ∈ S : (−xs, ys) ∈ T .
This axiom says that all observed netput vectors are technologically feasible and thus that
they should belong to the (unobserved) production set T . This is really an empirical postulate
rather than a production postulate. It makes that we exclude empirical phenomena such as
measurement error or outlier behavior.4
A2 (monotonicity): if z ∈ T and z′ ≤ z then z′ ∈ T.
Monotonicity, sometimes also referred to as ‘strong (or free) disposability’ of inputs and
outputs, implies that the producer can always costlessly dispose unwanted inputs and/or outputs.
That is, more inputs cannot lead to producing less outputs and producing less outputs cannot
lead to using more inputs. It implies that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between
inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere negative or, in other
words, there is no congestion.
A3 (convexity in netput space): if z ∈ T and z′ ∈ T , then λz + (1− λ) z′ ∈ T for all
λ ∈ [0, 1] .
A4 (convexity in input space): if x ∈ LT (y) and x′ ∈ LT (y), then λx+ (1− λ)x′ ∈ LT (y)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] .
Convexity in netput space entails that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between
inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere increasing. Convexity in
input space, finally, is a weaker version of A3 and entails non-decreasing marginal rates of input
substitution.
Apart from these specific production axioms, the (axiomatic) DEA approach typically builds
on a ‘minimal extrapolation’ requirement, which says that the production set approximation
should be the minimal set that is consistent with the axioms adopted; see Banker et al. (1984).
3In a theoretical framework, Shephard (1970) provides a comprehensive list of production axioms (including
ours), which we do not intend to fully review. Other axioms presented in the DEA literature (see, e.g., Fa¨re et
al. (1994)) are not considered because they are not instrumental to our following discussion.
4See, e.g., Grosskopf (1996) for extensions of DEA that weaken this assumption.
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Production set approximations. Different production set approximations are obtained from
different sets of axioms. First, if we impose axioms A1 and A2, then the resulting production
set approximation consistent with the minimum extrapolation principle is the monotone hull of
the data: M(S).5
M (S) = {z ∈ Rq |z ≤ zs for some s ∈ S } (3)
Second, if we additionally assume convexity in the netput space (i.e. axiom A3), then we get
the convex monotone hull of the data: CM(S).6
CM (S) =
{
z ∈ Rq|∀s ∈ S : z ≤
∑
s∈S
λszs, λs ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈S
λs = 1
}
(4)
Finally, replacing axiom A3 by axiom A4 leads to the approximation CIM(S), which cor-
responds to M(S) with the additional property that input requirement sets are convex.7
CIM (S) =
(−x, y) ∈ Rq
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀s ∈ S : x ≥∑s∈S λsxs and λsy ≤ λsys
with λs ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈S λs = 1
 (5)
Increasing stringency of the different assumptions underlying these three production set ap-
proximations implies
M(S) ⊆ CIM(S) ⊆ CM(S). (6)
The sets M (S) , CM (S) and CIM (S) are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for respectively
netput space and input space. Figure 1 represents these production set approximations for a
situation with 3 producers that use a single input to produce a single output, i.e. S1 = {1, 2, 3}
and zs = (−xs, ys) ∈ R− × R+, with s ∈ S. The monotone hull of the data M (S1) is the area
under the full line, while CM(S1) coincides with the area under the dotted line. Observe further
that for this particular situation (with only one input and one output) M (S1) = CIM (S1).
Figure 2 represents the input requirement sets for a situation with 3 producers that each produce
the same output with two inputs, i.e. S2 = {1, 2, 3} and zs = (−xs, y0) ∈ R2− × R+, with s ∈ S.
5See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993) suggested this approximation
in a DEA context.
6See Afriat (1972) for more discussion. Banker et al. (1984) proposed it in a DEA context.
7See Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) for more discussion. Bogetoft (1996) considers this approximation in a
DEA context.
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As the three producers in S2 produce exactly the same output y0, we get that LCM(S2) (y0) =
LCIM(S2) (y0).
Figure 1: Empirical production possibility sets
Figure 2: Empirical production possibility sets
From these illustrations we can conclude that production axioms directly affect the empirical
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production set. Hence, an important question pertains to the validity of these axioms. Unfortu-
nately, there does not seem to exist any a priori reason why a production set should necessarily
be monotone or convex. In fact, it turns out that monotonicity and convexity assumptions are
problematic in many practical settings, and that reliable non-parametric specification tests are
currently not available; see Cherchye and Post (2003) for an in-depth discussion. McFadden
(1978; pp. 8-9) aptly summarizes that the common rationale for monotonicity and convexity as-
sumptions in production theory lies in their analytical convenience rather than in their economic
realism. As such a ‘non-engineering’ justification of DEA is recommendable, which motivates
our ‘behavioral’ (or ‘economic’) perspective in the next section.
3 Economic efficiency analysis: a non-parametric approach
While the axiomatic approach focuses on the specification of production possibilities, we now take
the dual perspective: we start from a specification of the production objectives and impose the
least structure on the production possibilities. Production objectives vary in different situations.
The most frequently maintained position is that producers pursue profit maximization. In some
instances, however, cost minimization for given output might seem a more reasonable assumption.
For instance, when the producer is a price taker in input markets but operates in regulated output
markets (as is often the case for public agencies).
In the following, we focus on profit and cost efficiency analysis of producer k (∈ S), i.e.
the producer associated with netput choice zk = (−xk, yk). In the first subsection, we assume
that profit efficiency and cost efficiency are evaluated at (non-zero) price vectors pk ∈ Rq+ and
wk ∈ Rl+, respectively. In the second subsection we deal with the setting in which this price
information is not available.
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3.1 Cost and profit efficiency with price information
The minimum cost that could have been achieved by producer k (i.e. the producer associated
with input choice xk) when producing yk is
8
cT (zk, wk) = min
x∈LT (yk)
xwk. (7)
We say that producer k acts cost efficiently if the observed cost equals the minimum cost (i.e
xkwk = cT (zk, wk)) and cost inefficiently if cT (zk, wk) is below xkwk.
Similarly, the maximum attainable profit at pk is defined as
piT (zk, pk) = max
z∈T
zpk. (8)
Again, profit efficiency (resp. inefficiency) is achieved by producer k when zkpk = piT (zk, pk)
(resp. zkpk < piT (zk, pk)).
Inefficient production behavior is often observed in practice and can have different interpre-
tations; see, e.g., Demsetz (1997) for an extensive discussion. Observed producer inefficiency
can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the producer optimization problem may be ill-
specified. For example, the producers objective function can be erroneously defined; e.g. the
objective function may not be fully linear in netputs (due to imperfect competition). Second, as
the specified producer objective is typically that of producer owners, producer inefficiency can
also be interpreted as would the producer owners incompletely control the producer managers
(i.e. inefficiency due to agency problems). Both explanations instantiate the need for economic
efficiency measures, to serve either as indicators of ‘economic significance’ of specification er-
rors (see Varian, 1990) or as ‘performance’ indicators (and possible monitoring instruments for
producer owners; see Bogetoft (1994)).
Intuitively, meaningful efficiency measures give us an idea about how ‘close’ observed behavior
is to optimizing behavior. In general, a reasonable measure of ‘closeness’ tells us how far the
producer fails to optimize the postulated objective function. For example, when the production
objective is specified as profit maximization, a reasonable measure should capture how much
8For simplicity we assume that minimum cost (in (7)) and maximum profit (in (8)) is defined wherever needed.
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additional profit the producer could have acquired if it had behaved differently.
Cost efficiency measurement. For xkwk > 0, Farrell (1957) suggests as a measure for cost
efficiency the ratio of minimal to actual cost, i.e.
CT (zk, wk) =
cT (zk, wk)
xkwk
. (9)
It is clear that CT (zk, wk) ∈ [0, 1].9
As discussed above, the precise specification of T is usually unknown. Therefore, the starting
point within the non-parametric approach to analyzing production behavior is that a (non-empty)
subset {(−xs, ys)|s ∈ S} ⊆ T is observed (i.e. axiom A1 in Section 2). In principle, one may
conduct a cost efficiency analysis by replacing T by this set. This gives minimal (‘necessary’)
non-parametric tests for economic efficiency and upper bound estimates for the degree of cost
inefficiency, i.e. CS (zk, wk) ≥ CT (zk, wk) by construction (for some k ∈ S).
However, in practice additional assumptions about the set LT (·) can be useful.10 For example,
Varian (1984) assumes that less output does not require more input, i.e.
A5 (free output disposability): if (−x, y) ∈ T and y′ ≤ y, then (−x, y′) ∈ T .
Axiom A5 is a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom A2. We note that our below reason-
ing is easily extended to accommodate for alternative assumptions regarding output disposability
(like those considered in Fa¨re et al. (1994)).
As in the previous section, we can then again obtain an approximation of the production
possibility set. Axiom A1 and axiom A5, combined with the minimal extrapolation requirement,
leads to
OM (S) = {(−xs, y) |y ≤ ys for some s ∈ S } . (10)
Note that by construction OM(S) is a subset of the set M(S), defined in (3), since the latter
9This measure is not defined for xkwk = 0. Given that x ∈ Rl+ for all (−x, yk) ∈ T and wk ∈ Rl+ we have
xkwk = cT (zk, wk) = 0 in that case. That is, cost efficiency is attained, and we can assign a cost efficiency value
of unity to producer k. To keep the exposition simple we abstract from this case in the following.
10This enlarges the set of possible comparison partners. Otherwise, cost efficiency analysis, for example, could
only compare the cost level of the evaluated producer to that of other observed producers that produce exactly
the same output vector, of which the number is usually very small. However, it is worth emphasizing that cost
efficiency analysis is possible even when only using axiom A1. An insightful discussion of this point is given by
Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1999).
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assumes monotonicity for the set T .
When axioms A1 and A5 are rightly conjectured, necessary tests for cost efficiency can be
performed with respect to OM (S) and an upper bound for the cost efficiency measure in (9)
can be derived, i.e. COM(S) (zk, wk) ≥ CT (zk, wk) for some k ∈ S.
Profit efficiency measurement. Nerlove (1965) proposed two types of measures: difference
measures and ratio measures. We restrict attention to ratio profit efficiency measures, since these
measures have a convenient degree interpretation.11
We need to distinguish two cases. First, for piT (zk, pk) > 0 we define the degree measure
Π+T (zk, pk) =
zkpk
piT (zk, pk)
. (11)
Second, for piT (zk, pk) ≤ 0 and zkpk < 0 we define
Π−T (zk, pk) =
piT (zk, pk)
zkpk
. (12)
Note that in the limiting case piT (pk) = zkpk = 0 profit efficiency occurs. Consequently, we
can simply attribute an efficiency value of unity to producer k in that case, i.e. ΠT (zk, pk) = 1
if piT (pk) = zkpk = 0. Obviously, ΠT (zk, pk) ∈ (−∞, 1] with a value of unity revealing profit
efficiency and a value below unity capturing feasible relative profit increase.
Finally, we again have to approximate T by using the set of observed netput vectors (indexed
by S). As discussed above, this could lead to several different approximations (M(S), CIM(S),....).
For the sake of brevity, we will make abstraction of this discussion in the setting of profit effi-
ciency measurement and we will only focus on the setting that starts from the observed set of
netput vectors (i.e. we only impose axiom A1.)
11Within the non-parametric literature difference and ratio measures for profit efficiency have been discussed
by Banker and Maindiratta (1988). Our basic insights readily extend towards difference measures; compare
with Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck (2007). In addition, ratio measures are easy to work with under limited
price information (see our discussion in Section 3.2). At this point, it is also worth indicating that Chambers
et al. (1998) considered a general class of profit efficiency measures (with ‘directional distance functions’ as
dual counterparts). As they explain, the ratio measure for profit efficiency on which we focus here (with the
McFadden gauge function as a dual version; see Section 4.2) fits in this framework as a special case. Actually, our
following arguments can be extended to the general class of measures considered by Chambers et al. (1998). For
compactness, we abstract from discussing this extension here, and restrict to briefly indicating the relationship
with these authors’ general framework at the end of Section 4.2.
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3.2 Measuring shadow cost and profit inefficiency
Not only the set T but also price vectors are often imperfectly observed, or the prices that
are observed may not reflect the true opportunity costs perceived by producers. In that case a
shadow price approach can be followed, i.e. basically those prices are selected that are ‘most
favorable’ to the observation under evaluation (see, e.g., Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Nelson (1990)).
Below we consider the extreme case where the evaluator only knows pk ∈ Rq+ and wk ∈ Rl+,
while excluding the zero vector. In words, we assume that prices can take any non-negative
value, but they can not all be zero simultaneously. Note that, while we exclude the case where
all input and output prices are zero, we still allow for zero (shadow) prices for some input and/or
output commodities.
Shadow cost efficiency. Using OM (S) ⊆ T the (incomplete information) counterpart of (9)
can be defined as (for some k ∈ S)
CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= max
w∈Rl+
{
cOM(S) (zk, w)
xkw
|xkw > 0
}
. (13)
To show how one can compute this measure, we have to reformulate it. In this ratio formula-
tion prices can be scaled without affecting the value of CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
. In fact, shadow prices
as obtained within the non-parametric approach typically have a ratio interpretation only. That
is, they express the value of one commodity relative to that of other commodities, but they bear
no direct interpretation in terms of the absolute value of each commodity, at least not without
additional price information. Thus, we can set the ‘shadow’ cost level of producer k equal to
unity without losing the informational content of the corresponding (relative) shadow prices, i.e.
we can use
CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= max
w∈Rl+
{
cOM(S) (zk, w) |xkw = 1
}
. (14)
Further using definitions (7) and (10), we can equivalently reformulate (14) as
CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= max
w∈Rl+,c
{c |xkw = 1 and c ≤ xsw for all s ∈ S for which ys ≥ yk} . (15)
This last formulation makes clear that simple linear programming tools suffice to compute
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CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
. The implicit ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ pricing, i.e. the selection of most favorable
(shadow) prices, is reflected in the max operator. Obviously, the index CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
) ∈ [0, 1]
gives an upper bound for the ratio measure CT (zk, wk) under incomplete price and incomplete
technology information.
Shadow profit efficiency. Similarly, we can use shadow prices to deal with incomplete price
information (i.e. pk unknown) to analyze profit efficiency. Then, the analogues of the profit
efficiency measures (11) and (12) are respectively
Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
= max
p∈Rq+
{
zkp
piS (zk, p)
|piS (zk, p) > 0
}
(16)
and
Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)
= max
p∈Rq+
{
piS (zk, p)
zkp
|piS (zk, p) ≤ 0 and zkp < 0
}
. (17)
These measures can be re-expressed as
Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
= max
p∈Rq+
{zkp |zsp ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S} (18)
and
Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)
= max
p∈Rq+,u∈R+
{u |zkp = −1 and zsp ≤ −u for all s ∈ S} . (19)
The possibility of zero actual profit and non-zero maximal profit is captured in Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
,
while the possibility of non-zero actual profit and zero maximal profit is captured in Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)
.
The only remaining problem occurs when producer k is profit efficient only at prices that generate
a zero profit level, i.e.
max
p∈Rq+
{zkp |zkp ≥ zsp for all s ∈ S } = min
p∈Rq+
{zkp |zkp ≥ zsp for all s ∈ S } = 0. (20)
Such cases can be detected using linear programming tools. Clearly, we cannot reject profit
efficiency when (20) holds.
Consistent with the idea of benefit of the doubt weighting we propose as a profit efficiency
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measure
ΠIS
(
zk,Rq+
)
=
 max
{
Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
,Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)}
1
if (20) does not hold
if (20) holds
. (21)
The index ΠIS
(
zk,Rq+
) ∈ [0, 1] gives an upper bound for the ratio measure ΠT (zk, pk) under
incomplete price and incomplete technology information. Not only the mere efficiency value but
also the fact whether (20) holds and, if (20) does not hold, whether Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
or Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)
yields the maximum in (21) provides useful information, and is thus preferably considered to-
gether with the profit efficiency value. As our exposition makes clear, this information tells us
whether the shadow prices that are implicitly used involve a profit, a loss or a break-even for the
producer under study.
4 Bridging the gap: the economic meaning of DEA
The dual formulation of the linear programming problem (15) reveals a one-to-one relationship
between the above measure for cost efficiency and the Debreu (1951)- Farrell (1957) input measure
for technical efficiency.12 Similarly, the dual problems of (18) and (19) show a relationship
between the proposed measure for profit efficiency and the ‘McFadden gauge’ function (see
McFadden (1978)). These dual interpretations bring to light the economic interpretation of DEA,
which typically computes technical efficiency measures (Debreu Farrell measures) with respect
to axiomatic approximations of the production possibility set. That is, it allows for interpreting
these DEA measures as measures for violations of economically optimizing behavior.
12This relationship in fact illustrates the duality between cost functions and the Shephard input distance
functions (Shephard (1970)), which have the same informational content as the Debreu-Farrell input technical
efficiency measures. In particular, the Debreu-Farrell input measure for technical efficiency is reciprocal to the
Shephard input distance function; see Debreu (1951) for more discussion.
14
4.1 Cost efficiency
The dual formulation of (15) is (for some k ∈ S)
CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= min
κ∈R+,λs∈R++
{κ|
∑
s∈S
λsxs ≤ κxk,
∑
s∈S
λs = 1 and λsys ≥ λsyk for all s ∈ S}.
(22)
This can equivalently be reformulated as
CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= min
κ∈R+
{κ|(−κxk, yk) ∈ CIM(S)}. (23)
Hence, CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
can be computed as the maximum equiproportionate reduction of
inputs within CIM(S). This is precisely the Debreu-Farrell input measure defined with respect
to CIM(S). The fact that this reference production set is obtained falls in line with the general
result that monotonizing and convexifying input requirement sets does not interfere with the
analysis of cost efficiency; see Varian (1984) for more discussion. That is, the minimum cost
level remains unaffected and thus CIOM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= CICIM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
. Hence, minimal cost
reduction is also given by the maximal equiproportionate input shrinkage factor as computed
with respect to CIM(S).
We illustrate our discussion by means of Figure 3. This continues our example introduced in
Figure 2, but now S
′
2 = {(1, . . . 5)} and zs = (−xs, y0) ∈ R2− × R+, with s ∈ S; i.e. we include
two additional observations. The input vectors are displayed in Figure 3. The input requirement
sets associated with different sets of axioms are the same as those in Figure 2.
Let us first consider economic/cost efficiency. Suppose that the relative input prices cor-
respond to the slope of the bold iso-cost line. Under these input prices, the vector x1 is cost
minimizing. Obviously, this conclusion does not change when imposing monotonicity and/or
convexity on the input possibilities. The same result applies for measures of cost efficiency.
For example, for the vectors x4 and x5 the associated cost efficiency ratios equal 0x4′/0x4 and
0x5′/0x5, respectively; monotonicity and convexity assumptions do not alter these results.
Next, turn to the situation of incomplete price information. From (23), an upper bound
approximation for the cost efficiency measure is then provided by the Debreu-Farrell input mea-
sure as computed with respect to the convexified and monotonized input requirement set. The
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resulting value equals 0x4”/0x4 for x4 and 0x5”/0x5 for x5. The upper bound interpretation is
immediate: 0x4”/0x4 > 0x4′/0x4 and 0x5”/0x5 > 0x5′/0x5. Further, cost efficiency is achieved
by x2 and x3; both vectors meet the necessary condition for cost minimization under the (mini-
mal) information that is available about technology and prices.
This example illustrates that DEA measures provide upper bound approximations for cost
efficiency measures, and that imposing convexity can improve (i.e. lower) these upper bound
estimates. Indeed, convexity does not interfere with economic efficiency results and imposing it
does even enhance the upper bound interpretation of technical efficiency measures in terms of
economic efficiency. However, it is worth to emphasize that imposing convexity does interfere
with technical (or DEA-type) efficiency analysis as such; see for instance the results for x5.
Figure 3: The economic meaning of DEA
4.2 Profit efficiency
For profit efficiency we obtain as dual problem for (18)
Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
=
[
max
κ∈R,λs∈R+
{
κ
∣∣∣∣ ∑s∈S λszs ≥ κzk and ∑s∈S λs = 1 }]−1 . (24)
This measure captures (the inverse of) the maximum equiproportionate expansion of netputs
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(or scale augmentation) within CM (S). This is the McFadden gauge function as computed with
respect to CM (S).
Π+S
(
zk,Rq+
)
=
[
max
κ∈R
{
κ
∣∣∣∣ κzk ∈ CM(S) }]−1 . (25)
Similarly, the dual problem of (19) is
Π−S
(
zk,Rq+
)
= min
κ∈R,λz∈R+
{
κ
∣∣∣∣∣∑
s∈S
λszs ≥ κzk and
∑
s∈S
λs = 1
}
(26)
= min
κ∈R
{κ |κzk ∈ CM(S)} . (27)
This measure captures the maximum equiproportionate netput reduction (or scale reduction)
within CM (S). As such, it can be labeled the ‘inverse’ McFadden gauge function. Expres-
sions (24) and (26) are consistent with the established fact that imposing monotonicity and
convexity on production possibilities does not affect profit efficiency analysis, i.e. ΠIS
(
zk,Rq+
)
=
ΠICM(S)
(
zk,Rq+
)
.13
Note that (24) and (26) reveal alternative directions of measurement to evaluate profit effi-
ciency under incomplete price information. Both directions fit within the general directional dis-
tance function framework to evaluate (shadow) profit efficiency discussed in Fa¨re and Grosskopf
(1997) and Chambers et al. (1998). Interestingly, the benefit of the doubt idea (underlying the
shadow price approach that is followed) suggests (endogenous) selection of the most favorable
direction of measurement.14
This benefit of the doubt idea also gives the economic intuition behind (24) and (26). First,
for any price vector under which actual (and maximum) profit is positive, the maximum netput
scale expansion (within CM (S)) gives the minimum proportional profit expansion (compare
with (24)). Similarly, if actual (and maximum) profit is negative, then reducing netput scale to
a certain degree (within CM (S)) always reduces the profit loss to the same degree (compare
with (26)).15 Since we do not know the actual prices, we need to consider both scenarios, and
the benefit-of-the-doubt idea suggests selecting the most favorable scenario (see (21)).
13See Varian (1984) and Banker and Maindiratta, (1988) for more discussion.
14See also Cherchye et al. (2010) for an elaborated discussion of this interpretation of the Mc Fadden gauge
function in terms of profit efficiency.
15Observe that the benefit of the doubt principle calls for selecting prices that yield actual and maximal profit
with the same sign, as this guarantees the profit efficiency measure to be non-negative.
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5 Application
In the previous sections, we highlighted the interpretation of DEA models as measuring viola-
tions of economically optimizing behavior. Our following application on efficiency in academia
illustrates how crucial the specification of an appropriate behavioral model is. In a first step,
we evaluate universities’ efficiency in terms of cost minimization, by following the shadow price
approach that we presented above. In a following step, we analyze the (possibly distortive) ef-
fects of using nonverifiable assumptions regarding behavioral objectives and technical production
possibilities.
Data and variables. Our application uses data on 133 US universities in 2011-2012.16 The
universities in our sample are all reported in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking in the year
2012. This ensures a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample. The sample consists of both
public and private universities, where 89 universities are public and 44 are private. From the
private universities, we only selected non-profit institutions, to guarantee that all universities in
our sample share similar objectives.
We consider two inputs and three outputs. First, we use two categories of staff as univer-
sity inputs: academic staff, which have teaching duties and conduct research, and other (non-
academic) staff, which includes administrative and technical staff. Next, we use undergraduate
student enrollments, graduate student enrollments and number of doctor’s degrees granted as
outputs. Table 1 provides some summary statistics for our selection of inputs and outputs.17
Mean. Std. Min. Max
Input Academic staff 2284 1275 355 6297
Other staff 5165 3537 963 21557
Output Undergraduate enrollments 17833 10183 650 55016
Graduate enrollments 5248 3216 757 16373
Doctor’s degrees 322 215 2 892
Table 1: Summary statistics data
16We retrieved our data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which collects and analyzes
detailed information on education in the United States.
17Staff and student enrollments are expressed in full-time equivalents.
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Core model. We believe that cost minimization provides a suitable behavioral model to eval-
uate the efficiency of the universities in our sample. Indeed, we may reasonably argue that
outputs are to a large extent exogenous (i.e. beyond the control of university managers), so that
cost minimization for given outputs is a plausible assumption. Thus, following our argument
to impose minimal prior structure (and to avoid unverifiable assumptions) for the production
behavior that is evaluated, the cost efficiency measure CIOM(S) (or, equivalently, its dual speci-
fication CICIM(S)) constitutes an appropriate efficiency measure for the setting that we consider
here. Therefore, we will use this measure as our core efficiency measure in our following analysis.
Table 2 presents some summary statistics on the efficiency scores for our core model. We
find that the average cost efficiency in the sample equals 0.86, which indicates that the average
cost reduction potential amounts to 14%. Interestingly, the average efficiency is rather high,
which conforms to our expectation that most universities effectively do operate in a (nearly) cost
minimizing manner.
Next, when distinguishing between public and private universities, we observe that public
universities operate on average more cost efficient than their private counterparts. Moreover,
when focusing on the median efficiency measures, we find that more than 50% of the public
universities turns out to be cost efficient, while the opposite conclusion applies to private univer-
sities. In this respect, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the null hypothesis that public and private
universities achieve the same efficiency level returns a p-value of only 9, 9%. This significant dif-
ference seems to indicate that private universities must have (slightly) different objectives than
simply cost minimization.
Mean Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
CIOM(S) = C
I
CIM(S) 0.86 0.28 0.76 0.98 1.00 1.00
→ public 0.90 0.33 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00
→ private 0.83 0.30 0.68 0.97 1.00 1.00
ΠIS 0.62 0.23 0.42 0.58 0.85 1.00
BCCI = CICM(S) 0.70 0.20 0.55 0.69 0.87 1.00
Table 2: Summary statistics efficiency results
Alternative specifications. In what follows, we discuss two alternative efficiency measures
that build on stronger prior assumptions regarding the objectives and production possibilities
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underlying the observed university behavior. As we will show, these measures do indicate a
considerable amount of inefficient behavior. Because the assumptions underlying the two effi-
ciency measures are difficult to motivate a priori, we argue that the differences with the efficiency
results for our core model should be interpreted as indicating an ill-specified behavioral model
(and not inefficiency per se). This clearly illustrates the basic argument of our paper: erroneous
production assumptions may substantially distort the efficiency analysis (and the conclusions
that are drawn from it).
Our first alternative measure uses the assumption that universities pursue profit maximization
instead of cost minimization. Table 2 gives the corresponding results for the profit efficiency
measure ΠIS . For our sample, we find that the average value of Π
I
S amounts to only 0.62,
which is considerably below the average cost efficiency value that we obtained before (i.e. 0.86).
This result should actually not be surprising as profit maximization is a substantially stronger
assumption than cost minimization. However, we find it hard to motivate this assumption for
the current setting (which contains only public and private non-profit institutions). Therefore, in
our interpretation the substantial amount of profit inefficiency primarily reveals an ill-specified
model of university behavior. In turn, this provides an additional motivation for using our core
model of cost minimization.
Our second alternative measure maintains cost minimization as the behavioral objective but
puts additional structure on the production possibilities. We recall that, in its dual interpretation,
our core model corresponds to the measure CICIM(S), which uses the Axioms 1, 2 and 4. To
define our alternative efficiency measure, we replace Axiom 4 (i.e. convexity in input space) by
the stronger Axiom 3 (i.e. convexity in netput space). Following a similar argument as above,
we can show that this obtains the shadow cost efficiency measure
CICM(S)
(
zk,Rl+
)
= min
κ∈R+,λs∈R++
{κ|
∑
s∈S
λsxs ≤ κxk,
∑
s∈S
λs = 1 and
∑
s∈S
λsys ≥ yk}. (28)
Actually, the expression on the right hand sight defines the technical input efficiency measure
that was presented by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), which is widely used in DEA appli-
cations. We denote the measure as BCCI in Table 2. We find that the average value for this
measure amounts to no more than 0.70, which again is significantly below the one for our core
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model. Similar to before, we conclude that the convexity assumption has a substantial impact
on the efficiency results. In our opinion, because there is no a priori argument to use Axiom 3
as a valid production assumption for the setting at hand, this provides an additional motivation
for using our core model here.
6 Summary and concluding discussion
We have reconsidered the economic motivation of DEA by highlighting its behavioral interpre-
tation. Duality relationships can justify the use of certain production postulates in order to
draw inference about economic efficiency performance, and so rationalize the use of certain DEA
models. This potential use of DEA is all the more attractive since its engineering motivation is
often unpersuasive. Importantly, the appropriate DEA model depends on the economic efficiency
concept that is under consideration. In fact, this perspective may institute original efficiency eval-
uation models; see e.g. Cherchye et al. (2008, 2011 and 2012) who develop new nonparametric
methodology for analyzing multi-output production by adopting a similar behavioral perspective
of DEA.
We plead for carefully checking the validity of axioms that can interfere with the test results,
and for investigating the sensitivity of the results with respect to these axioms if it is difficult
to verify them empirically. In our opinion, such practice falls in line with the non-parametric
philosophy, which advocates minimal risk of specification error. Our empirical application demon-
strated the importance of carefully specifying the behavioral production model in order to obtain
a meaningful efficiency analysis. In this application we first motivated cost minimization as a
good behavioral assumption to evaluate the efficiency of US universities. Next, we showed that
our efficiency conclusions were very sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the behavioral
objective (profit maximization versus cost minimization) and production possibilities (convexity
in netput space instead of input space).
Three further points pertain to our specification of the production-decision problem. First,
the economic efficiency tests and measures discussed above implicitly assume that prices do not
vary with quantities and that the eventual quantities and prices are perfectly anticipated by
producers. The presented economic efficiency measures can be employed to quantify violations
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of these hypotheses. However, when different assumptions seem more appropriate, then the
behavioral model is to be adapted, which in turn can motivate alternative DEA models (e.g. the
monotone hull model (see (3)); compare with Cherchye et al. (2000) and Kuosmanen and Post
(2002)).
Second, for expositional convenience we have restricted attention to producers that seek to
minimize cost or maximize profit given the production technology and the input-output prices. In
many environments, we need to impose additional restrictions, e.g. due to the non-discretionary
nature of exogenously fixed inputs or outputs or because producers face additional cost or revenue
constraints (see, e.g., Fa¨re and Grosskopf (1994)). In a similar vein, there may be specific
characteristics of the data that should be accounted for when designing the appropriate efficiency
evaluation model: input or output values may not be continuous but subject to discreteness,
interval or categorical restrictions (see, e.g., Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007)). Once more,
different specifications of the production-decision problems entail alternative efficiency analysis
(DEA) models.
Third, it may often be useful to include additional technological information, to obtain a
strengthened efficiency analysis. For example, one may want to include specific assumptions re-
garding the prevalent returns-to-scale, conditional convexity or local (instead of global) convexity
properties of the production technology (see e.g. Kuosmanen (2001), Fried et al. (2008), Cook
and Seiford (2009)). To focus our discussion, we did not explicitly consider such assumptions
here. However, our basic argument pleads for using these assumptions only if they can be moti-
vated convincingly prior to the actual DEA evaluation (e.g. by available technology information
or, alternatively, by duality relationships to particular economic objectives).
Summarizing, the core idea of this paper is that starting from a careful specification of
the production-decision problem, which depends on the specific application setting, can provide
economic motivation of alternative and perhaps even novel DEA models. We believe that it is
important to strongly hold on to this economic perspective in practical applications, rather than
‘blindly’ resorting to standard, so-called ‘well-established’ models. In our opinion this forms a
natural precondition for meaningful DEA applications.
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